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Abstract 
 
7KLV SDSHU DLPV WR VKRZ WKDW HFRQRPLF WKHRU\ KDV EHFRPH µGHVRFLDOLVHG¶ DQG
separated from social theory through the adoption of individualistic methods and 
neglect of social relations and structures. A historical overview traces how the 
social content of economic theory has diminished, considering the reasons why. 
Desocialisation has stemmed from the desire for boundaries between academic 
disciplines, which drove economics towards individualism and other social 
sciences towards structural methods. Such an artificial divide between economic 
theory and social theory is argued to be detrimental to all the disciplines 
concerned. Restrictions imposed by desocialised theory have practical 
consequences for how we understand and model the economy. Some reforms that 
would loosen the restrictions so as to promote a resocialised economics are 
suggested. 
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Introduction 
 
Theoretical work in social science has been divided between economic theory and social 
theory, which exist in separate literatures that seldom collaborate or refer to each other.  
Economic theory is practised by scholars within the economics profession who publish in the 
associated journals.  The unqualifieG WHUPµHFRQRPLF WKHRU\¶usually denotes the orthodox, 
neoclassical approach: its staple components are methodological individualism, instrumental 
rationality, and strong equilibrium concepts.  Heterodox economists reject neoclassical 
theory, proposing various alternatives, but form a minority group with meagre influence on 
the economics discipline.  Teaching of economics rests almost exclusively on textbooks 
purveying the orthodox viewpoint.  
 
    Social theory is practised by scholars outside economics; linked primarily with sociology, 
it extends into anthropology, politics, psychology, cultural studies, linguistics and other 
disciplines.  Unlike orthodox economics, it is pluralistic, having no single body of core 
principles.  Most social theorists do not subscribe to the tenets of neoclassical economics ± as 
WKH WHUP µVRFLDO WKHRU\¶ implies, they prefer theories founded upon social relations and 
structures.  They may write about economic subject matter, in fields such as economic 
sociology, economic anthropology and political economy, but their papers rarely get 
SXEOLVKHG LQHFRQRPLFV MRXUQDOVDQG ODFN WKH LPSULPDWXURI µHFRQRPLFV¶  Few economists 
read this research, though its relevance for economics should be obvious.  The 
economic/social divide in theory remains as firm as ever. 
 
    For the economic and social to occupy different theoretical realms is odd, since economic 
activities cannot be isolated from ones supposedly non-economic and thereby social.  Only in 
fantasies of perfect competition do atomistic agents interact anonymously in an 
institution-free environment to yield efficient outcomes.  Actual economic behaviour occurs 
among pre-existing institutions that lend it a social dimension.  Economic theorising has 
played down the social side of behaviour, yet the quest for a purely individualistic economics 
has proved futile.  An economic theory bearing any resemblance to the real world must be a 
social theory as well.  Likewise, a general social theory must incorporate economic activities.  
Durable societies have to sustain themselves by looking after their material welfare, and in 
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this respect social activities are entwined with economic ones.  Even cultural and artistic 
pursuits, often viewed as aloof from the economy, need a physical setting.  No social 
behaviour is disengaged from economic life, and a split between economic and social theory 
can only be arbitrary.  The economic and social can, at most, be distinguished through a 
nested or hierarchical relation rather than a division.  From a materialist angle, all social 
activities are conditional on material production, so that the social lies on an economic base.  
Conversely, a general social theory might embody economic behaviour (and economic 
theory) as a subset.  Either way round, the two are bound together.  Distinguishing the 
economic from the social does not warrant a dichotomy between economic and social 
theorising. 
 
    How did the dichotomy come about?  Initially absent from social studies, it emerged 
during the early twentieth century when professional social-science disciplines were being 
forged.  This paper discusses how economic theory was deprived of social content to become 
µdesocialised¶, considers what desocialisation entails, and asks whether it could be reversed.  
While it has succeeded only too well in demarcating economics from other disciplines, it has 
hampered economic thought by blinkeriQJ HFRQRPLVWV¶ YLVLRQ DQG retarding their grasp of 
social context.  Ambitions to organise a stand-alone economics profession have erected a wall 
between economic and social theories.  The potential for resocialising economics is huge, but 
so are the obstacles to reforming a discipline now suffused with neoclassical thought. 
 
 
 
 
The Nature of Desocialisation 
 
A desocialised economic theory can be defined as one that minimises social relations and 
structures, treating them as secondary to the individual.  Theorising starts at the individual 
level, never at the social level, and regards the individual agent as the core component.  There 
is a blanket commitment to individualism, in which valid explanations begin with 
individuals; social elements, if present, should be generated from individual behaviour.  
Theories that breach this commitment are deemed unsatisfactory and inferior to those built 
from individualistic first principles.  In a desocialised theory, social relations and structures 
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have secondary status, tolerated where necessary as specific items grafted on to an 
individualistic framework but preferably explained as the product of individual actions.  The 
pressure is always to remove social content that has not been reduced to the individual level.  
Desocialisation as a process occurs when the social aspects of a theory ± social relations, 
structures, roles, classes and so forth ± are diluted in the shift towards individualism.  If 
pushed to its extreme, the process would eliminate social content to yield a theory composed 
entirely in individual terms.  It seldom goes this far and usually retains some vestigial social 
content, albeit as sparse as possible.  The desocialising of economic theory is best understood 
as downgrading social elements, rather than erasing them. 
 
    Total desocialisation could happen only in a hypothetical world of isolated, self-sufficient 
individuals living apart with no interactions, no groups or classes, and no roles or positions 
within institutions.  Such a world bears scant resemblance to any economy or society that has 
actually existed.  A desocialised social science would be an oxymoron and a bizarre goal for 
economic or social theorists.  The implausibility of total desocialisation is mirrored by the 
difficulties in tying down methodological individualism, which has had numerous definitions: 
some require explanation through individuals alone, others give priority to individuals but 
permit limited interactions among them (Udehn, 2001; Hodgson, 2007).  Only a theory 
devoid of social interactions would qualify as totally desocialised, and few examples spring 
to mind.  The nearest thing would be the atomism of general competitive equilibrium, but 
even this purist, rarefied theory has proved mathematically awkward and faced major 
technical problems (Rizvi, 1994; Ackerman, 2002; Kirman, 2006).  Efforts to turn the general 
equilibrium model into the lodestar of economic analysis have faded away, in favour of 
piecemeal approaches.  It has been widely accepted, by orthodox as well as heterodox 
economists, that the reductionist dream of explanation through individuals alone is 
unattainable (Arrow, 1994; Davis, 2003, Chapter 2).  Equivalently, all social elements cannot 
be expunged from economics. 
 
    Within mainstream economics, the prevalent individualism stipulates that economic 
modelling should use neoclassical theory based on rational individual choice.  Economic 
agents are instrumentally rational: they have given ends determined outside the model and 
pursue these ends efficiently (Hargreaves Heap, 1989, Chapter 3).  The accent on the 
individual ensures that the theory has a small-scale, disaggregated emphasis, characterised as 
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microeconomics, and requires social or collective outcomes to be explained through rational 
individual behaviour.  Since social structures and institutions lie beyond the core theory, they 
can only be peripheral (if they appear at all) and have secondary status; the theory is 
desocialised in the sense defined above.  Some insights from psychology, sociology and other 
social sciences have filtered through to the edges of the mainstream without changing the 
theoretical core.  Macroeconomics might seem to offer an exception to the individualistic 
slant, insofar that it follows Keynesianism and deals with aggregate outcomes that are not 
reduced to individual rationality.  Over the last few decades, however, macroeconomics has 
departed from its Keynesian heritage under the increasing compulsion to have 
µPLFURIRXQGDWLRQV¶ .LQJ  +RRYHU   Even macroeconomic models are now 
supposed to have a neoclassical core, or else they are queried as being unsound. 
 
    Economists who resist desocialisation are located outside the mainstream in the various 
schools of thought grouped together as heterodox economics.  The clearest example is 
American institutionalism in the tradition of Thorstein Veblen and John Commons, which 
opposed neoclassical theory and gave due credit to the institutional setting of economic 
activity (Hodgson, 2004).  From this perspective, economics should start with the institutions 
that underlie the economy and avoid any suggestion that economic agents have fixed, 
absolute preferences.  Institutionalists instead based their work on habitual and normalised 
behaviour shaped by the social environment.  Similar ideas are embodied in Marxian thought 
with the belief that theorising should examine the material forces of production, along with 
their effects on institutions (Marx, 1976-81).  Recent versions of such ideas are Regulation 
Theory and the Social Structures of Accumulation (SSA) approach, both of which address 
how institutions interact with the technical means of production (Boyer and Saillard, 2002; 
McDonough, 2008).  While still materialist, they seek to evade technological determinism 
and allow a place for the causal effects of institutions and culture.  Further distaste for 
individualism is voiced by Post Keynesians, in the desire to set aside WKH µQHRFODVVLFDO
V\QWKHVLV¶ DQG ILQG DOWHUQDWLYHV WR QHRFODVVLFLVP DV D foundation for Keynesian theories 
(Lavoie, 2006).  As with other heterodox schools, the preferred alternatives turn away from 
context-free agency towards the social and cultural influences on behaviour.  Heterodox 
economists have regretted the desocialising trend and argued against it, yet their views have 
had little purchase on the teaching and practice of orthodox economics. 
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The Process of Desocialisation 
 
In its origins, economics was just a branch of philosophy whose political and social facets 
were acknowledged through the name µSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\¶7KHHFRQRPLFVRFLDOGLYLde arose 
later with specialised social sciences, which brought pressures for each discipline to have 
self-contained theories.  Economics underwent a process of desocialisation whereby the 
social content of theory withered away into a residual to be invoked only if absolutely 
necessary.  The process took place in three stages corresponding to the main periods in the 
evolution of economic thought. 
 
 
Stage 1:  Classical Political Economy 
 
Modern economic thought dates back to the classical political economy of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, exemplified by writers such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo 
and John Stuart Mill.  Classical theory hails from the early years of capitalism; it attempts to 
portray the new economic arrangements and capture their essence.  Starting with a stylised 
picture of a capitalist economy, it explains economic growth DWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHOWKHµZHalth 
RI QDWLRQV¶ D topic that would nowadays be categorised as macroeconomics.  Because 
saving and investment are financed through profit incomes, the theory disaggregates national 
income into factor shares (profit, wages, rent) that accrue to economic classes (capitalists, 
workers, landowners).  Positive profits fuel investment and growth, so the theory has a 
developmental flavour.    Classical economists put forward a generalised model of how a 
capitalist economy is constituted and how it functions. 
 
    Within their model, individuals are tied to a social position, as against being autonomous.  
Classical saving patterns assume that profit recipients (capitalists) save, whereas wage 
recipients (workers) spend their whole income.  The difference derives not from exogenous 
preferences but from the economic roles played by agents.  We must know the structure of 
the economy before we can pronounce about economic behaviour.  Classical political 
economy abstains from the individualism later to be a shibboleth of orthodox economics.  
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Adam Smith did make the famous invisible-hand argument that self interest among producers 
may benefit society, but this stops short of total individualism and remains confined to 
capitalists fulfilling their roles.  7KHQRWLRQRIµHFRQRPLFPDQ¶RIWHQDVFULEHGWR-RKQ6WXDUW
Mill, was mooted tentatively during the classical era without being absorbed into the 
foundations of economic theory.  Classical economists avoided formal individualism ± the 
individualistic interpretation came afterwards, fostered by neoclassical hindsight. 
 
    Classical economic theory had only sketchy institutional features and never went as far as 
to endorse historical specificity or cultural relativism.  The pleas for competitive markets and 
laissez-faire policies, while responsive to current events, were intended to be universal.  In 
the early nineteenth century, literary authors and cultural commentators criticised classical 
political economy for its mechanical theorising and social myopia (Löwy and Sayre, 2001; 
Connell, 2001; Jackson, 2009, Chapter 3).  This line of critique, informed by Romanticism, 
saw classical economists as extending a rationalist, materialist mindset into areas where it 
was inappropriate, shunning culture and history in order to ape the natural sciences.  The 
subsequent trajectory of economics did not heed the early criticisms and moved ever further 
DZD\IURPWKHKXPDQLWLHV -XGJHGE\WRGD\¶VVWDQGDUGVFODVVLFal political economy seems 
quite social and institutional in its outlook, but it was not seen this way at the time and came 
under frequent censure for ignoring social matters.  
 
     
Stage 2:  Neoclassical Economics 
 
No single person can be accredited with neoclassical economics, but from the 1870s onwards 
a new strain of economics gradually came to the fore with the work of Jevons, Marshall, 
Menger, Walras and others.  Neoclassical theory was assembled around rational individual 
behaviour: µHFRQRPLF PDQ¶ RQO\ casual and informal within classical economics, was 
augmented into a core concept.  By stressing the individual, neoclassical theorists overlooked 
social classes and institutions, so the old interest in factor shares dwindled.  Rational agents 
were assumed to interact through trade to yield allocative (Pareto) efficiency.  The weak 
classical definition of competitive equilibrium, where profit rates are equalised through 
capital mobility, gave way to stronger definitions that insisted on market clearing (Clifton, 
1977; Eatwell, 1982).  Supply and demand curves made their entrance and proliferated, 
  
- 7 - 
 
eventually to dominate the teaching of the subject.  Orthodox economics, recast as an eternal, 
timeless theory, did not repeat the classical attempt to portray capitalist economies. 
 
    The classical-neoclassical transition was allegedly a step forward, for neoclassical 
economics claimed to encapsulate truths only hinted at by classical theory.  Early members of 
thHQHZVFKRROGLGQRWXVHWKHWHUPµQHRFODVVLFDO¶ZKLFKZDVFRLQHGODWHULQUHFRJQLWLRQRI
$OIUHG0DUVKDOO¶VZLVKWRILQGDOLQHDJHIURPWKHFODVVLFDOera (Aspromourgos, 1986).  Other 
neoclassical economists, less keen to draw upon classical thought, declared the novelty of 
their ideas.  Distinctive attributes of neoclassicism are its logical rigour, facilitating 
mathematical expression, and its account of economic behaviour built up from the individual 
level.  Any continuity with classical economics resides in just a few features of the classical 
literature, specifically the hazy individualism espoused by some classical writers, the 
principle of comparative advantage summarising the benefits of trade, and the invisible-hand 
argument that points to collective gains from individual self-interest.  Neoclassical economics 
seizes upon these features and restates them formally as the template for economic theory ± it 
aspires to reach the heart of economic behaviour, once and for all, transcending the efforts of 
classical theorists. 
 
    This is at best a selective inheritance from the classical period.  Other ingredients of 
classical economics, such as the accent on capital accumulation, class-based analysis, 
institutionally specific behaviour and an interest in factor shares, are omitted from 
neoclassical modelling.  Orthodox presumptions about the classical-neoclassical transition 
should not be taken for granted.  Heterodox scholars offer an alternative history of economic 
thought, in which neoclassical economics FDOOHG IRUWK WKH µPDUJLQDOLVW UHYROXWLRQ¶ DQG a 
departure from classical political economy (De Vroey, 1975; Nell, 1980; Birken, 1988; 
Milonakis and Fine, 2009).  Remaking economic theory in individualistic terms supplanted 
the classical model with a new one dissimilar in structure.  The atomism, rationality 
assumptions, static theories, market-clearing equilibria and focus on resource allocation were 
alien to the classical school.  Political and institutional factors took on lesser importance as 
the seeds were sown for economics to be mathematised, although the full extent of this was 
realised only in the late twentieth century.  Neoclassical theory (belying its title) had little 
affinity with classical political economy.  Other schools of thought, notably Marxian 
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economics and institutionalism, did more to preserve the legacy of classical theory insofar 
that they continued to honour social and political context. 
 
    The late nineteenth and early twentieth century was the climax of positivistic science.  
Neoclassical economics, with its façade of providing positive, value-free knowledge, suited 
the tenor of the times and could be depicted as being dispassionate and scientific.  Moral 
questions integral to economic thought during the classical era receded into the background 
(Alvey, 2000).  7KH TXHVW IRU VFLHQWLILF NXGRV SURSHOOHG WKH QDPH FKDQJH IURP µSROLWLFDO
HFRQRP\¶ZKLFKKDGan interdisciplinary hueWRµHFRQRPLFV¶At first, neoclassicism faced 
challenges from institutional, historical and Marxian alternatives, but these were encumbered 
by their historical specificity and value-laden standpoint; they could not so easily draw 
parallels with natural sciences, the exemplars of true scientific achievement.  Neoclassicism 
fended off its rivals and ultimately became the new orthodoxy.  By the 1930s economics was 
being redefined in a neoclassical vein: earlier definitions, which characterised economics by 
its subject matter, were disputed by the Robbins definition, which saw economics as the study 
of scarcity and choice (Robbins, 1932; Howson, 2004; Backhouse and Medema, 2009).  A 
static, neoclassical world view preoccupied with rational choice had taken over economics, 
now delineated by a single theory, not by its subject matter.  Dissenters from neoclassicism 
might be discussing economic issues but would not be economists.  The redefining of 
economics laid the groundwork for the modern mainstream. 
 
 
Stage 3:  Mainstream Economics 
 
What is now mainstream economics derives from the technical elaboration of neoclassical 
economics during the late twentieth century.  The mainstream originates in neoclassicism but 
includes variations on the neoclassical theme that relax key assumptions without abandoning 
them.  One can mingle WKHWHUPVµQHRFODVVLFDO¶DQGµPDLQVWUHDP¶DWsmall risk of confusion ± 
µPDLQVWUHDP¶KHUHGHQRWHs versions of neoclassical thought from the mid-twentieth century 
onwards.  As mainstream theory flourished, other schools of thought were pushed to the 
heterodox fringes of economics.  Teaching was consolidated around neoclassical doctrines 
presented to students as the building blocks of economic analysis. 
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    The mainstream relies heavily on mathematical methods, which have burgeoned since the 
1940s (Blaug, 1999; Weintraub, 2002).  Mathematisation strengthened the drift towards 
desocialised economics.  Mainstream models appeal to rational, utility maximising individual 
behaviour; aggregation is not straightforward, putting a brake on social levels of analysis.  
Theorising bypasses preference formation, the interdependence among preferences, structural 
influences on behaviour, and the formation of institutions.  Individuals, encompassed by their 
utility functions, have no identity beyond their preferences (Davis, 2003, Chapter 3).  
Economic theory is timeless and unbounded, as if historical circumstances are irrelevant and 
the same behaviour applies everywhere.  Alternative types of rationality (procedural, 
expressive) barely get a mention, nor does non-rational behaviour (Hargreaves Heap, 1989; 
Stewart, 1995; Tomer, 2008).  Institutions, when present, are appendages that constrain 
individual preferences but play no other part in forming behaviour.  This shows them in a 
negative light as external checks on rational agency and barriers to efficiency.  Theorising too 
much about institutions and social structures is disapproved, lest it should threaten 
neoclassicism and vindicate µQRQ-HFRQRPLF¶ PHWKRGV  6LQFH mainstream economics has 
retreated from evaluating the social origins of economic behaviour, the gap has had to be 
filled by heterodox economics and other academic disciplines, using social theory rather than 
economic theory.   
 
    Mainstream economics dwells on exchange (before production or consumption), but the 
rational-choice methods afford only a thin account bereft of social detail.  Exchange is 
assumed to arise spontaneously from trading opportunities among rational agents, with little 
allowance for property rights, contracts, trading roles and price setting.  The concept of the 
market, pivotal to orthodox discourse, has no clear definition and is linked with any trading 
or exchange (Hodgson, 1988, Chapter 8; Rosenbaum, 2000).  Markets become universalised 
as a natural order that emanates directly from specialisation and trade without prior 
institutions and governmental backing.  The supposed ubiquity of markets sits uncomfortably 
with the stringent requirements for perfect competition, which set a standard of anonymity 
and price taking that no real markets can attain.  Much trade described as a market in 
everyday language entails personal relationships among traders and negotiated prices distant 
from the neoclassical ideal (Goldberg, 1980).  A fuller theory should be sensitive to the social 
structures and relations underlying markets, along with the larger institutional context 
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(Fourie, 1991; Jackson, 2007).  The orthodox benchmark of a perfectly competitive market is 
so unrealistic that it has little practical value and misleads as a policy guide. 
 
    Despite often admitting its artificiality, mainstream economists retain perfect competition 
and award it a hallowed place in the teaching of economics.  Applied branches of the 
mainstream (public economics, industrial economics, labour economics, environmental 
economics, health economics, etc.) must diverge from it if their theorising is to be even 
vaguely realistic.  They are forced into µLPSHUIHFWLRQLVm¶ WKDW falls back on market 
imperfections as the only way to insert some much-needed institutional substance.  
Imperfectionist models quickly become mathematically tortuous, for extra constraints are 
added to the usual framework.  The basic neoclassical model, ill-suited to portraying 
economic reality, is an unhelpful platform that complicates further theorising.  This ought to 
worry mainstream economists, but they seem almost to relish the complications as 
opportunities for showing off technical skill and theoretical sophistication.  In scientific 
methodology, regular resort to constraints, amendments, adaptations and ad hoc assumptions 
should be a danger signal: it indicates a flawed research programme with a faulty theoretical 
core.  The case for alternatives, familiar to critics of orthodoxy, never quite penetrates 
through to mainstream economists, who evince doubts about the neoclassical core but are 
unwilling to relinquish it. 
 
      Disquiet within orthodoxy has prompted variations on the basic model (µPDLQVWUHDP
SOXUDOLVP¶), which sometimes make limited use of ideas from psychology and other 
disciplines: examples are the new institutionalism, behavioural economics, experimental 
economics, neuroeconomics, transaction-cost economics, and the use of game theory (Davis, 
2006).  Movements away from the neoclassical framework, which might appear more 
fundamental than imperfections, could be seen as preparing for the end of neoclassical 
orthodoxy and a paradigm shift (Colander, 2000; Colander, Holt and Rosser, 2004).  Yet the 
new fields do not sever ties with neoclassicism and keep well apart from heterodox 
economics.  Behavioural economics, for instance, picks out partial and small-scale exceptions 
to orthodox modelling; experimental economics obtains results at odds with neoclassical 
theory but hesitates to take up heterodox arguments; new institutional economics seeks to 
explain institutions through methods compatible with the mainstream; game theory relaxes 
the atomistic anonymity of general equilibrium models but upholds the individualism, 
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instrumental rationality and strong informational assumptions of neoclassical economics 
(Rutherford, 1994; Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 1995; Zafirovski, 2003; Sent, 2004; 
Earl, 2005; Fine and Milonakis, 2009; Santos, 2011).  Mainstream pluralism is marked by 
disparate adjustments to the neoclassical paradigm that do not cohere into a genuine 
challenge, as is evident from its refusal to cooperate with heterodox economics.  If anything, 
it sustains orthodoxy, inasmuch as it gives the impression of being critical without making a 
clean break and deflects attention from more radical critiques.  The desocialised core stays 
intact. 
 
 
 
 
Consequences of Desocialisation 
 
Desocialised theory glosses over how individuals are formed within society: they are the 
bedrock of the theory, so their behaviour is fixed and its origin goes unexplained.  Silence 
about the roots of individual behaviour leaves the impression that human activities are innate 
and natural.  Theory then has little feeling for culture, as it dismisses the cultivation of 
individuals within an institutional setting (Jackson, 2009, Chapter 2).  Culture is important in 
social theorising through its ability to connect individual and social levels of analysis and 
avoid over-reliance on one level.  Each level depends on the other ± individual agents 
develop their capabilities only inside their social environment; social structures and relations 
persist only if they are reproduced by individual agency.  This interdependence has been 
appreciated in recent social theory, where it is termed agency/structure duality and offered as 
an antidote to individualistic or structural reductionism (Craib, 1992, Chapter 7; Jackson, 
1999; Layder, 2006, Chapter 8).  Mainstream economics ignores duality arguments and relies 
on individual rationality as its sole foundation, either omitting social and cultural factors or 
treating them as secondary, external influences. 
 
    In a desocialised theory, the subordinate rank accorded to social levels of analysis obscures 
collective or class interests.  Legitimate theorising begins with individuals, not with economic 
classes, and the economy has no social constitution.  Individual behaviour seems absolute and 
independent of social roles or class positions.  With so little said about current institutions, 
  
- 12 - 
 
the details of contemporary capitalism dissolve in abstract, apparently universal analyses.  It 
becomes harder to allow for historical specificity, as is clear from the neglect of history in 
modern economics (Hodgson, 2001).  Collective institutions can be admitted only charily, for 
fear that they will upset the reductionist vision; any collective arrangements should be 
justified as the desirable outcome of individual behaviour.  Theorising about a capitalist 
economy cannot revolve around economic classes, and the issues surrounding class conflicts 
will be sidelined. 
 
    Desocialisation of economic theory has put arbitrary limits on how it is formulated and 
how it portrays human behaviour: theories must fit a template.  Those who stray from the 
template are not practising economics in the approved manner and must be undertaking social 
theory rather than economic theory.  The individualism of neoclassical thought creates a bias 
towards laissez-faire policies wherever the benchmark model of perfect competition is taken 
seriously as a policy goal.  Many mainstream economists resist this bias by stressing market 
failures and the grounds for state intervention by a rational, welfare maximising government 
(following the tradition of Marshall and Pigou).  In all cases, though, the social elements 
subsist precariously as add-on extras within a framework of individual agents.  Theorists see 
institutions as constraints, rules, rigidities, and so forth, which acquire negative connotations 
for hindering private enterprise.  Seeing institutions this way is far from inevitable, and there 
are many alternatives in heterodox economics and other social sciences.  The limits set by 
desocialised economic theory have no academic rationale; on the contrary, they discourage 
economic theorists from exploring the full range of theoretical possibilities. 
 
    A defence of the status quo in economics would be that it derives from a division of labour 
within social sciences, letting economists specialise in the study of typical economic 
behaviour.  The individualism of orthodox economics would be counter-balanced by the 
social and structural methods adopted by sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists and 
others.  Economists choosing one particular abstraction would not be a problem, thanks to the 
alternatives elsewhere in the social sciences.  Such a defence is weakened by the doubts over 
what economic behaviour means, as well as the hermetic separation imposed through 
disciplinary boundaries.  Research done outside the economics discipline rarely gets taken 
seriously as a contribution to economics ± carried out by people not designated as 
economists, it seldom appears in economics journals and goes unnoticed by the economics 
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profession.  The desocialised theory that dominates orthodox economics has acquired a near 
monopoly over what is perceived as genuine economic theorising.  Work coming from other 
disciplines, regardless of its virtues, will have trouble finding an audience and exerting an 
influence over policy making.  Alternatives elsewhere leave unchanged the primacy of 
desocialised theory.  A resocialised economics would have to be internal to the economics 
discipline, using ideas perhaps drawn from non-economic sources but then introduced into 
economic theory. 
 
 
 
 
Resocialising Economics? 
 
Recovering the social content of economics would mean redirecting the evolution of 
economic thought.   One should have no illusions about an easy change of course.  The 
momentum behind neoclassical theory gathered during the twentieth century and carried all 
before it; sceptical voices were swept aside as the mainstream view prevailed.  After reaching 
a putative consensus on core principles, mainstream economists have little appetite for 
rethinking them.  It remains worthwhile, all the same, to ask what would have to happen for 
mainstream economics to be transformed: the following developments would open the door 
to a resocialised economics. 
 
 
Pay heed to the history of economic thought 
 
A perspective on the history of economic thought is vital for a critical assessment of the 
discipline, otherwise trends like desocialisation will go unquestioned.  Mainstream economics 
has jettisoned historical and comparative studies, on the premise that current theories 
supersede all that came before ± economists should forget past doctrines and employ only the 
PRVW µPRGHUQ¶, µDGYDQFHG¶ techniques.  Students can now graduate with an economics 
degree, securing high grades, without the slightest exposure to the intellectual origins of 
neoclassical theory and the heterodox alternatives.  The history of economic thought, together 
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with economic history and other historical sub-disciplines, has been held in low esteem and 
lost ground in the teaching of economics (Blaug, 2002; Kurz, 2006).  Short on knowledge of 
how economics has evolved, students are poorly equipped to appraise the state of the 
discipline and have little choice but to comply with orthodox theory.  The mainstream creed 
has never been accepted by heterodox economists, who see the switch to neoclassicism as a 
mistake that ought (somewhat belatedly) to be corrected.  If the history of economic thought 
is demoted to being a specialist enclave, then arguments about the desocialising of economics 
are kept off the agenda. 
 
 
Drop the definition of economics as the study of scarcity and choice 
 
Mainstream economics opts for a static, allocative definition of the subject, whereby 
economics devotes itself to studying scarcity and trade-offs among resource uses.  Fixating 
on resource allocation and interpreting other economic activities as allocative choices accords 
with neoclassical theory ± exchange becomes paramount at the expense of other, equally 
important topics.  This narrow definition of economics originated with Robbins in the 1930s 
and gained supremacy only during the late twentieth century (Backhouse and Medema, 
2009).   Earlier definitions were broader, embracing activities other than resource allocation, 
and left space for variety in economic theorising.  Economics should be defined by its subject 
matter, not its theories, to ensure that no theory has privilege in deciding who is an 
economist.  7KHµHFRQRPLFZD\RIWKLQNLQJ¶VKDSHGE\QHRFODVVLFDOWKHRU\DQGSURPXOJDWHG
by orthodox textbooks, serves to debar those wishing to think differently.  Prospects for a 
resocialised economics would improve if the discipline dropped a definition that 
overemphasises rational choice and deters economists from examining the social roots of 
economic behaviour. 
 
 
Pursue an explicitly non-reductionist approach 
 
Methodological individualism, woven into the fabric of mainstream economics, impedes 
social or cultural arguments: a sound theory must view everything through the lens of rational 
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individual behaviour.  Theories constructed around institutions or social structures do not 
obey this rule and are written off as incomplete.  Only by discarding the individualism can 
economic theory possess a social level of analysis that exists in its own right, irreducible to 
the individual.  Strong versions of methodological individualism, which aim for explanations 
from atomistic behaviour alone, have been revealed as unfeasible (Davis, 2003; Hodgson, 
2007).  The reductionist ambitions of the general-equilibrium research programme have been 
toned down, but individualism is alive and well in weaker versions that make do with 
minimal social content.  For economics to be resocialised, the failure of the reductionist 
project and the impossibility of true methodological individualism would have to be 
recognised more fully than it is at present.  Theorising should be explicitly non-reductionist, 
with a layered or stratified format that allows individual agents and social structures to 
interact (Lawson, 2003, Chapter 2; Hodgson, 2004, Part V).  At times individual or social 
factors may predominate, but theorists should eschew giving universal priority to one 
analytical level.  
 
 
Permit greater pluralism of theory and method 
 
Mainstream economics, turning on a neoclassical hub, is happy with its monistic theoretical 
FRUH DQG WUDYHOV QR IXUWKHU WKDQ µPDLQVWUHDP SOXUDOLVP¶ within a single paradigm.  To 
resocialise economics would necessitate greater pluralism taking in ideas from outside the 
mainstream paradigm, perhaps organised into alternative paradigms.  Heterodox economists 
have often advocated pluralism, an attitude that stems from the multiple strands within 
heterodox thought and wariness of uniformity (Dow, 2004; Garnett, 2006; Lee, 2011).  
Pluralism could bring drawbacks, as diversity based on inconsistent paradigms might descend 
towards incoherence: the paradigms might talk past each other, pursuing separate research 
agendas and building their own theoretical systems.  A pluralistic economics could become 
fragmented into various schools of thought (neoclassical, post-Keynesian, Marxian/radical, 
institutionalist, Austrian, etc.) with little in common.  Most heterodox schools do have shared 
features beside their opposition to orthodoxy, including the desire for a fuller treatment of 
VRFLDO FRQWH[W  $ FDVH FDQ EH PDGH IRU µVWUXFWXUHG SOXUDOLVP¶ WKDW FURVVHV WKH PXOWLSOH
paradigms within heterodox economics to find common ground on how economics could be 
reconstituted (Dow, 2004).  Pluralism need not reach a relativist extreme; agreement on 
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theoretical and methodological principles remains welcome, but these should be less narrow 
than the ones favoured by orthodoxy.  Layered theory defined with suitable breadth and depth 
can accommodate internal variety, multiple levels of abstraction and historical specificity 
(Hodgson, 2001, Chapter 21).  Individual and social layers can coexist within a larger theory 
that lets the significance of layers vary over time and place.  Theorists would then be at 
liberty to choose an individual or social emphasis as befits the case in question. 
 
 
Remove the wall between economic and social theory 
 
The wall dividing economic theory from social theory rests on the false assumption that the 
former is individualistic and the latter structural, matching the customary image of academic 
work in economics and sociology.  This crude dichotomy harms theoretical endeavours in 
both disciplines ± there are no grounds for it.  The wall was erected in the early twentieth 
century, when new social sciences were eager to carve out their own academic territories: 
potential overlaps between economics and sociology were avoided through a tacit agreement 
that economic theory would follow a non-social path, on neoclassical lines, and leave social 
theories to the sociologists (Hodgson, 2001, Chapter 13; Milonakis and Fine, 2009, 
Chapter 12).  Professionally expedient, the arbitrary distinction was never persuasive and 
ignored by many writers.  It survives in the estrangement of economic and social theory, 
which may not always adhere to their individualistic/structural stereotypes but are undertaken 
by different scholars, published in different academic journals, associated with different 
disciplines, and taught to different students.  Social theory contains a pool of varied ideas that 
cover all social behaviour, economic activities included, and tackle the fundamentals of social 
interaction (Craib, 1992; Harrington, 2005; Layder, 2006).  Much social theory, if applied to 
economics, could provide alternatives to neoclassicism as a foundation for the discipline.  
While sociologists and other social scientists draw on this literature, few economists do so; 
most seem unaware that social theory exists.  Undue specialisation of academics across the 
economic/social divide has sealed off orthodox economics from outside influences, 
preventing the influx of new ideas.  For economic theory to be resocialised, the wall between 
economic and social theory would have to come down.  Theorising could be designated as 
economic if it dealt with material production, distribution and consumption, but not by any 
diktat about individualism. 
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Use mathematics more critically and selectively 
 
Mainstream economics has become wedded to mathematical and quantitative methods, to the 
extent that mathematics is now the official medium for economic research.  Verbal theories 
struggle to gain acceptance from the economics profession, whatever the merits of the 
arguments.  Mathematics does not perforce bring desocialisation but has been allied with 
individualistic, rational-choice methods: the atomised neoclassical model engenders a neat 
mathematical portrayal of economic behaviour.  Richer accounts of human action, with social 
as well as individual levels of analysis, do not lend themselves to mathematical expression.  
The modern economic literature rarely discusses appropriate use of mathematics, interest 
being confined mostly to heterodox circles (Agiomirgianakis and Mavromattis, 1998; 
Drechsler, 2000; Hudson, 2000; Katzner, 2003).  Mathematical theories pull mainstream 
economists away from social affairs, which become the province of non-economic 
disciplines, and lay a veneer of technical sophistication on a sparse, mechanical picture of 
human behaviour.  The remedy would be to revive the scepticism about mathematics that 
held sway among economists until the mid-twentieth century but has since almost 
disappeared within the mainstream.  It is not essential to renounce mathematical techniques 
but merely to use them judiciously on the right occasions.  Ironically, they are most 
successful when economic behaviour has been socially constructed in a mathematical or 
quantitative mould, for example when it is guided by accounting systems, budgetary rules, 
game-like environments, and so on.  They are less successful as a global model of behaviour, 
yet this is how they are deployed in neoclassical theory. 
 
 
Draw parallels with the humanities, not the natural sciences 
 
Mainstream economics prides itself on being the µKDUGHVW¶among the social sciences, close to 
natural science in its methods.  Empiricism and rationalism dominate economic methodology, 
theory imitates physics or engineering, and mathematics is the language.  A strong 
positive/normative distinction relies on the dubious claim that the core theory is value free, so 
that values can be appended separately.  Natural-science imitation, if pressed to the lengths 
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seen in mainstream economics, submerges what is distinctive about the humanities.  For 
delving into human behaviour the empirical and theoretical methods of natural science are 
insufficient: we cannot directly observe thoughts and motives and we cannot explain human 
action through logical reasoning alone.  We must instead make an effort at interpretation, 
directed towards both individual behaviour and social context.  The distinctive approach of 
the humanities is not empiricism and rationalism, which were designed for natural sciences, 
but interpretative methods centred on meaning, language, empathy and understanding 
(Taylor, 1979; Ricoeur, 1981; Outhwaite, 1986).  These methods are adopted in history, 
sociology, linguistics, anthropology and philosophy (often under the labels hermeneutics and 
semiotics) but hardly surface in economics.  An exception, normally classified as sociology, 
is the economic research of Max Weber, whose concept of Verstehen encourages scholars to 
interpret subjective states of mind among human actors, along with the meaning of signs and 
symbols; in his best known economic study, he aimed to understand the values promoted by 
Protestant religion and trace their links with the early development of capitalism (Weber, 
1964, Chapter I, 2002).  Interpretation permeates all human discourse, but mainstream 
economics seems oblivious to it, as if meanings were straightforward ± it receives proper 
attention only from heterodox economists (Berger, 1989; Lavoie, 1990; Gerrard, 1993; 
Jackson, 2009, Chapter 10).  Empirical studies and logical reasoning, which remain important 
in social sciences, need to be accompanied by interpretative methods.  Once admitted into 
economics, they would cast doubt on the formal, ahistorical abstractions of neoclassical 
theory and raise sensitivity to historical and social circumstances.  
 
 
Respond to student demands for a more varied economics syllabus 
 
Recent years have witnessed students calling for a shift away from a narrow economics 
syllabus centred on neoclassical theory towards a broader one embracing other approaches.  
The prime example is the Post-Autistic Economics Movement that started with a revolt by 
French economics students against attempts to push economics teaching further towards 
neoclassical methods (Fullbrook, 2003).  Overt protests have so far been confined to a vocal 
minority of students but are likely to represent latent disquiet on a larger scale.  Doubts about 
economics teaching have been heightened by the ongoing global financial crisis: students and 
the general public are asking questions about why mainstream economics did not foresee 
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problems that now seem plain.  Under this scrutiny, it would be in the self-interest of 
economists to diversify their teaching and not let the profession stand or fall with one 
approach.  Alternatives to neoclassical theory are readily available ± they would help to meet 
student demands for a more diverse syllabus and offer greater relevance to the real world by 
acknowledging institutions and social context. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Can economics ever be resocialised in the way envisaged here?  Intellectually the scope for 
this is clear enough from the work of heterodox economists and others writing on economic 
subjects.  Using existing ideas, economics could be taught in a pluralistic, socially alert 
fashion with inputs from related disciplines.  The roadblocks to a resocialised economics are 
not intellectual but practical and institutional: the economics discipline has come to regard 
neoclassical methods as the only legitimate ones.  Generations of economics students have 
been taught mainstream economics and nothing else, on the pretext that there is no alternative 
and that modern mainstream theory is the pinnacle of economic thought.  Dissenters from the 
prescribed maxims risk damaging their careers as economists.  The power of vested 
disciplinary interests guarantees that it will be hard to reverse chronic trends and reshape the 
foundations of the subject. 
 
    A starting point, however, would be for economists to realise how their discipline has 
changed.  In its early days as classical political economy, it was awake to the social setting of 
economic behaviour and did not fence itself off from social and political concerns.  Classical 
economists theorised on several levels, individual and social, and never decreed that 
economics must be studied on an individualistic basis.  Their moderate theoretical stance was 
lost in the later turn towards reductive neoclassical thought, which spread axiomatic 
individualism across all economic theorising and divided economic theory from social theory.  
The example of the classical school, if it were better known, would demonstrate that 
alternative foundations for the discipline are possible.  Economists reluctant to take lessons 
from other social scientists might be willing to learn from their own forebears.  Resocialising 
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economics would require a break with its recent past but not with its origins in classical 
political economy. 
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